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Crash-Free Sequencing Strategies for Financial
Development and Liberalization
JORGE A. CHAN-LAU and ZHAOHUI CHEN*
This paper uses a stylized model of financial intermediation to characterize the exact
circumstances along various paths of economic growth, financial development, and
liberalization that can trigger a financial crisis. It shows how to avoid financial
crises through proper sequencing of various financial development and liberaliza-
tion measures. The results of the paper show that naive combinations of financial
development and liberalization processes can give rise to financial crises. In some
typical situations, in order to avoid a financial crisis, it is important that financial
liberalization be accompanied by financial development, in the form of improve-
ments in the financial sector’s efficiencies. In the case of fast growing economies,
financial development becomes even more imperative. [JEL E44, F3, G15]
T
he importance of financial liberalization and financial development in the
process of economic growth was recognized early on by Goldsmith (1969),
McKinnnon (1973), and Shaw (1973) among others. Well-developed financial
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systems perform a number of functions that influence the process of economic
development. These functions include increased risk sharing, the facilitation of
information acquisition and corporate control, the reduction of transaction
costs, and the efficient allocation of savings among productive activities. In
fact, a growing body of empirical studies has found a positive link between
financial development and long-run economic growth.1 It is not surprising,
then, that policies aiming to accelerate the pace of financial development and
liberalization have gained acceptance in an increasing number of countries
during the last few years.
However, the recent financial crises in Asia and Russia have led to a reexam-
ination of and a heated debate about the wisdom of the process of financial devel-
opment and liberalization, both in academic and policy making circles.2 At the
academic level, it has been argued that increased globalization, and hence, finan-
cial liberalization, has made countries with sound economic policies vulnerable to
financial crisis driven by a number of factors, including self-fulfilling expecta-
tions (Obstfeld, 1996), herd behavior by portfolio managers (Calvo and Mendoza,
2000), or the impossibility of smoothing out local liquidity shocks owing to the
incompleteness of the structure of interregional claims (Allen and Gale, 2000),
among others. At the policy making level, there is an ongoing debate on norma-
tive issues. On the one side is the camp that favors imposing controls and restric-
tions, on the other side is the camp that argues for more rapid and complete
financial development and liberalization. On the former, Joseph Stiglitz vividly
describes an emerging market as a small boat in the rough sea of international
capital flows, where even a well-built boat can founder. On the latter, Lawrence
Summers suggests that financial markets are like the airline industry: modern
planes are stronger and larger, and make flying cheaper, faster, and safer.
However, when disaster strikes, the negative consequences are magnified. The
way out is not to ban airplanes or the financial markets, but to further improve the
industry facilities.3
Nevertheless, even those that consider that perfect and completely open finan-
cial markets are the ideal goal for most countries agree that openness cannot be
achieved overnight.4 However, holding financial development in its infancy may
not be the right solution: it may isolate the country from external financial shocks
but it would deprive the country of the benefit of cheap international capital (and
embedded technology). So the main task facing policy makers is a positive one:
to find a path from an underdeveloped financial market to one of full and free
participation in the international capital markets. The path can be risky, since the
danger of a financial crisis may be looming menacingly along the transition.
Nevertheless, countries must undergo the duress of the often troublesome
“teenage” stage if they want to be part of the “adult” financial community. In this
1Levine (1997) surveys the recent literature on financial development and economic growth.
2An assessment of both the theoretical and practical aspects of capital account liberalization is
presented in Eichengreen and others (1999).
3The Economist, March 14, 1998.
4See the article “Seminar discusses the orderly path to capital account liberalization,” IMF Survey,
Vol. 27, Number 6, March 23, 1998.“teenage” stage, proper policy sequencing is essential as expressed clearly in the
April 1998 “Communiqué of the Interim Commmittee of the Board of Governors
of the International Monetary Fund:”5
The financial crisis in Asia has given heightened attention to the role of
capital flows in economic development. The effects of the crisis have not
negated the contribution that capital movements have made to economic
progress in the Asian countries before the crisis erupted. Rather, the crisis
has underscored the importance of orderly and properly sequenced liberal-
ization of capital movements [. . .]
Choosing a path that steers clear of the danger of a financial crisis is a two-
step process. The first step is to identify the circumstances under which a financial
crisis can occur. The second step is to formulate strategies that avoid such circum-
stances while moving towards the goals of financial development, liberalization,
and economic growth. In other words, it is necessary to establish what precondi-
tions must be satisfied before moving forward with financial development and the
liberalization of the capital account. This paper presents a model that provides a
simple analytical framework that helps us to identify the circumstances under
which financial liberalization can be counterproductive by creating the necessary
conditions for a financial crisis.6 In addition, the model provides an explanation to
the puzzling observation that recent crises have affected fast growing countries
that, prior to the crisis, enjoyed access to cheap international capital markets and
were considered stellar performers. Do fast growth and easy access to interna-
tional capital increase the risk of a financial crisis? Contrary to common percep-
tion, we find that the answer to the first question is positive most of the time. We
also discuss how growing economies can avoid a financial crisis.
The results obtained in our stylized model require that we narrowly define the
concepts of financial development and liberalization, that often have broad mean-
ings in the literature.7 Financial development is defined as improvements in the
efficiency of financial intermediation. It includes two aspects: (a) Improvements
in financial infrastructure that lead to reduction in the sunk cost of financial inter-
mediation. Examples may include physical completion of bank branches, comput-
erization, deposit insurance, the establishment of proper accounting and disclosure
rules and legal framework. (b) Improvements in the operating efficiency of the
intermediaries—in other words, the reduction in marginal costs of financial inter-
mediation. Examples may include the enhancement of credit analysis and risk
management skills; reforms that eliminate crony capitalism, cozy but inefficient
group cross holding, and improper government subsidies and intervention, and any
other reductions in costs proportional to the amount of intermediation. Financial
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5International Monetary Fund Press Release No. 98/14, April 16, 1998.
6The advantage of this simplified framework is that the policy issues can be easily analyzed using a
graphical approach. However, by emphasizing crisis-aversion as the overwhelming concern, the model
cannot address the welfare costs and benefits associated with financial development and liberalization.
The reader interested in these issues should refer to Caprio and others (1994).
7See Caprio and others (1994) and Dooley (1996).liberalization is defined as the removal of controls to allow market determination
of interest rates, and/or to allow competition. Typically, liberalization of interest
rates in a regime of financial repression tends to lead to an initial rise in domestic
interest rates, while an increase in competition—through free entry of domestic
and foreign financial institutions—tends to lead to lower domestic interest rates.
Capital account liberalization also leads to free capital flows that tend to equalize
domestic and foreign interest rates.
I. The Model
Our analysis is an extension of the financial crisis and credit crunch model
presented in Chan-Lau and Chen (forthcoming), to which we refer the reader for
further technical details and assumptions.
There are three risk neutral agents in the economy: an entrepreneur
(borrower), a depositor (foreign or domestic creditor), and a financial interme-
diary. We assume that the intermediary has limited monopolistic power so that it
cannot fully pass the intermediation cost on to the entrepreneur when this cost is
too high. This is the usual case in most of the developing countries where compe-
tition is limited and the government regulates the interest rate to some degree. It is
assumed that all the agents are risk neutral.
The entrepreneur owns the rights to a risky project as well as an illiquid asset
with terminal value E. In our representative entrepreneur’s economy, E can also be
interpreted as the market valuation of the fundamental strength of the economy, or
the economy’s collateral value in the eyes of foreign creditors. To finance the
project, the entrepreneur borrows from the intermediary at the gross rate 1 + iL. In
case of success, the project’s return is enough to pay back the loan principal and
the interest. Otherwise, it returns nothing and the illiquid asset is seized by the
intermediary (up to the amount of the loan plus the loan interest) and transferred
to the creditor (up to the amount of the deposit plus deposit interest). The proba-
bility of success of the project depends on the effort level of the entrepreneur. If
the effort level is high the probability of success of the project is pH, otherwise it
is equal to pL, with pL < pH. The effort level depends on monitoring by the inter-
mediary. If the intermediary monitors the loan, then the entrepreneur’s effort is
high, otherwise it is low. Monitoring has a broad meaning, including project
screening, auditing, on-site inspection, and other corporate governance mecha-
nisms and is costly.
The financial intermediary borrows an amount D from the depositors at the
gross rate 1 + iB, and lends it to the entrepreneur. Its payoff is given by:
min{D(1 + iL), E}
In case that E > D(1 + iB), the intermediary can pay back the principal and inter-
ests. Otherwise, it transfers the collateral E to the depositor. Thus, in our setup, the
intermediary is a limited liability institution.
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if. Because the depositor must earn at least the risk-free rate, the amount of credit
he is willing to supply to the intermediary is given by: 
(1)
(2)
where the subscripts m and  u denote that monitoring is performed or not
performed, respectively. The amount of intermediation under monitoring is greater
than that without monitoring, and they are both increasing in the borrowing rate iB
and decreasing in the risk-free rate.8
Monitoring loans is an activity that involves both fixed and variable costs. In our
model, the costs represent the extent of the inefficiency in financial intermediation.
Fixed costs include sunk costs, overhead costs, salary and wage costs, expenses in
branch facilities and equipment (computers), which are typical of banking institu-
tions, as well as costs resulting from the legal and supervisory environment, such as
bankruptcy enforcement costs. Variable costs include operating and administrative
costs, as well as regulatory costs resulting from mandatory reserve ratios, etc. In
different country environments, these costs take different forms.9Arguably, substan-
tial investment in banking infrastructure in many emerging markets has made fixed
costs relatively low, but operating efficiency has lagged far behind owing to inade-
quate staff training, obscure accounting systems, and lack of disclosure and compe-
tition. Banking costs, both fixed and variable costs, are higher in emerging market
countries than in developed countries.10
Technically, we represent these costs by the following simple cost function:
The cost is a function of the size of the loan, D, the entrepreneur’s asset E, and the
efficiency of the monitoring technology, which is measured by the parameter β >0
and by a fixed cost φ > 0 and reflect the efficiency of the intermediary. The inter-
mediary can monitor projects requiring a loan size less than Dφ by paying a fixed
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8For details on the derivation of these equations, see Chan-Lau and Chen (forthcoming).
9For example, in South Korea the cozy relationship between banks and chaebols implies a potentially
low fixed cost of monitoring because they know each other well. However, the cost of disclosing and
acting on the information gathered is potentially costly.
10See Barajas, Steiner, and Salazar (1999) for details.not monitor the entrepreneur, which makes the probability of success of the
project known to all agents. There is no asymmetric information.
We focus on the case in which the amount of intermediation (or loan size) plus
interest exceeds the value of the collateral, that is, D –
m(1 + iB) > E, which holds
when Eφ /E > ∆ i/(1 + iB)(1 + iL). In this case, the expected profit of the interme-
diary is given by:
(3)
Similarly, when the intermediary does not monitor, its expected profit is given by:
(4)
Monitoring takes place only when it generates more profits than without
monitoring:
(5)
The amount of the loan offered to the entrepreneur by the intermediary as well as
the decision to monitor or not depend on: (a) the efficiency of the intermediary, as
measured by its monitoring costs, (b) the interest rate differential, ∆ i = iL – iB, (c)
the credit supply by the depositors, as defined by equations (1)-(2), and (d) the
terminal value of the existing asset E. There exist six possible cases, which can be
classified according to the magnitude of various monitoring costs relative to the
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11These cases and their corresponding choice of monitoring action and deposit demand by the inter-
mediary are analyzed in detail in the appendix.In Case 1 the economy is vulnerable to the risk of financial crisis or crash,
which is defined as the sudden discrete reversal of capital inflows into the
banking system, a phenomenon that resembles a credit crunch. Formally, this
crisis-prone equilibrium can be defined as one in which there is an insufficient
demand for credit by the intermediary. A formal definition of this and other
equilibria is presented in the appendix. It is easy to describe the crisis-prone
equilibrium using Figure 1. The thick lines represent the expected profit to the
financial intermediary, with a local maximum at the point Dφ , which is the
optimal amount of intermediation with monitoring. D –
u is the maximum supply
of credit by the depositor and depends positively upon a measure of the funda-
mental strength of the economy E. An important feature of this model is that a
small change in credit supply can trigger a large capital outflow and/or credit
crunch. From Figure 1, we can see that the amount of equilibrium intermedia-
tion (when demand for credit equals credit supply) can increase, unmonitored,
after the switching point D*. When credit supply is between Dφ and  D*,
however, there is no demand by the intermediary because its expected profit is
below the local maximum, so the intermediary borrows only Dφ . So even when
D –
u declines to a level marginally below D*, the size of capital outflow is as
large as D*–Dφ .
In this work, we are more concerned about the process of financial develop-
ment, financial liberalization, and economic growth, so the economy would be
able to switch from one case to another as the interest rate differential, the costs
parameters, and fundamental strength change. In our simplified setup, the
narrowing of the interest rate differential results from the process of financial
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Figure 1. Case 1—A Mechanism for Financial Crisisthe financial reform process.12 It is of special interest to pinpoint the conditions
under which either financial development and liberalization or both processes can
put the economy at risk by shifting it to Case 1.
The analysis is greatly simplified if the six different cases are graphed in a
three-dimensional space, where the orthogonal axes correspond to the sunk cost,
φ , the marginal cost, β , and the interest rate differential, ∆ i = iL – iB. The bound-
aries among the different cases are determined by the following surfaces: 
which are depicted in Figures 2 and 3. For expositional purposes, we will refer to
the region corresponding to Case 1 as Region 1, Case 2 as Region 2, and so on. In
particular, Region 1 will be referred to as the crisis-prone region. Figure 2 shows
the case in which the deposit rate iB is fixed and changes in the interest rate differ-
ential correspond to changes in the lending rate iL. In this case, S1 is a nonlinear
surface because ∆ iDφ is a nonlinear function of iL.
In Figure 3, the lending rate iL is fixed and we let the deposit rate iB vary. In
this case, S1 is a linear function of the interest rate differential ∆ i. For convenience,
we choose to use the interest rate differential ∆ i as one of the axes instead of iL in
Figure 2, and instead of iB in Figure 3. Our graphical framework does not preclude
the analysis of simultaneous changes in iL and iB: first, we use Figure 2 to analyze
a change in iL keeping iB fixed and afterwards, change iB while keeping iL constant
at its new level.
In addition, the level of financial development in the economy at any point can
be represented by the ordered pair (φ , β ) in the φ –β plane. Therefore, we can
represent any economy by the ordered set (φ , β , ∆ i), which grossly represent the
degrees of financial development and financial liberalization.
II. Financial Liberalization Unaccompanied 
by Financial Development
Consider a case of financial liberalization as characterized by a decrease in ∆ i due
to a decrease in the lending rate, iL. This decrease in the interest rate differential
can be interpreted as a result of increasing competition in the banking sector,
which erodes the monopolistic power of the domestic banking sector, or the
reduction of capital account restrictions. Assuming that the borrowing rate is
constant (as in the case of a small country’s international borrowing), we can
restrict our analysis to the situation depicted in Figure 2. If the economy is either
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12As noted earlier, liberalization of interest rates in a regime of financial repression tends to lead to
an initial rise in domestic interest rates, hence the widening of the interest rate differential, whose effect
can be analyzed in the model.CRASH-FREE SEQUENCING STRATEGIES
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Figure 2. Possible States of the Economy (constant deposit rate)
Figure 3. Possible States of the Economy (constant lending rate)certain levels of financial development, represented as different combinations of
sunk and variable costs (φ , β ). For example, in Figure 4, financial liberalization
moves the economy from point A to point B, the latter inside the crisis-prone
region. Thus, financial liberalization can move an economy to a situation in
which it would be vulnerable to a financial crisis. The wider the range of pairs (φ ,
β ) the more vulnerable an economy is, since it increases the likelihood that finan-
cial liberalization can put it at risk if financial development does not complement
the former process.
It is possible to characterize precisely the combination of fixed and marginal
costs (φ , β ) (or levels of financial development) such that financial liberalization
may increase the vulnerability of the economy to a financial crisis or domestic
crunch. It is simply the area in the φ –β plane that lies between the β axis and the
projection in the φ – β plane of the intersection between the surfaces S1 and S3. We
can define the vulnerability region as the level of financial development, repre-
sented by the pairs (φ , β ), such that a large enough decrease in the interest differ-
ential can move the economy to the crisis-prone region. Strictly speaking, the
vulnerability region, denoted by A1, can be represented as:
(6)
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Figure 4. A Case Where Financial Liberalization Leads to a Financial CrisisIII. Financial Development Unaccompanied 
by Financial Liberalization
Under the assumption that there is no financial liberalization, and the deposit
interest rate remains fixed, ∆ i is constant and we can analyze the process of finan-
cial development in the φ – β plane, which simplifies the analysis greatly. Without
loss of generality, for a given interest rate differential, the analysis is reduced to
the projection of the six regions in the φ – β plane, as represented as in Figure 6.
Notice that only the economies in Region 2 are at risk of being vulnerable to
financial crisis if the process of financial development reduces the sunk cost φ
faster than the variable cost β , because the economy may move from Region 2 to
Region 1 as a result. Therefore, financial development must decrease the marginal
operating cost faster than the fixed cost. In fact, without knowing with certainty in
which region the economy is located, the safest strategy is to reduce the variable
cost first, say until it is below ∆ p∆ i, and then to proceed to reduce the fixed cost
φ . In the operational sense, this suggests that reform measures should first focus
on enhancing the credit analysis and monitoring expertise and operating efficien-
cies of the intermediaries, rather than improving the banking infrastructure that
relates only to the fixed cost aspects of financial intermediation.
Technically, if the initial position of the economy is in Region 2 and known
with certainty, say, at (φ 0, β 0), any proper sequencing of financial reform that
avoids leading the economy to Region 1 must be such that the speed of fixed and


















Figure 5. Financial Development: Vulnerability Region A1(7)
Of course, if the initial position is outside both Region 1 and Region 2, then any
sequencing of financial development is fine, without the danger of a financial
crisis.
To summarize, in the absence of financial liberalization, the choice of
sequencing is reduced to the relative speed of financial developments in the two
fronts: one that reduces the fixed costs of intermediation, the other that reduces the
marginal costs of intermediation. When the current efficiency position is in doubt,
it is always safer to embark on operating efficiencies first.
IV. Financial Development and Liberalization
The proper sequencing of financial development and liberalization must be such
that the trajectory of the economy avoids the crisis-prone region depicted in
Figures 2 and 3. Because there exist many different trajectories corresponding to
different financial development and liberalization measures such that the crisis-
prone region can be avoided, policy makers have many degrees of freedom to
choose the one that minimizes their cost-benefit trade-off, according to their own
policy goals. As an example, suppose that the sunk cost, φ, is fixed and the







































Figure 6. A Case Where Too Quick a Relative Reduction in Sunk Costs 
Leads to a Financial CrisisIf the desired goals of liberalization and reform must be such that the final
position of the economy is at point D, there are many ways to achieve this objec-
tive. One of them is to start the financial development process first while delaying
financial liberalization until the reform objectives have been achieved. This is
illustrated by the trajectory ABD. Another way to proceed is to start both financial
development and liberalization simultaneously, such that the speed of financial
development is faster than the speed of liberalization, that is, the slope of the
segment AC
—
is flatter than that of the segment AE
—
. Once the economy has reached
point D, it is safe to start reducing the fixed cost component.
In general, when the policy maker is uncertain about the economy’s current
position, the safest way to proceed is to develop the financial sector first and then
to undertake financial liberalization. Financial development should start by
decreasing the marginal cost component of the financial intermediation sector, and
then proceed to reduce the fixed cost component. We must keep in mind, though,
that the sequencing described does not guarantee a crash-free evolution, since the
economy is still subject to deposit rate shocks and shocks to the fundamental
strengths of the economy. The effects of these shocks are discussed in the
following two sections.
V. Shocks to the Deposit Rate iB
Consider the case of financing by foreign deposits. Assuming that all the other
variables remain constant, shocks to the world interest rate, iB, can be interpreted

















Figure 7. Two Examples of Crash-Free Sequencing Strategiescase where financial liberalization precedes financial development, with the
vulnerability region, A1, redefined as:
(8)
Referring to Figure 3, an increase in the deposit rate, iB, keeping iL constant,
is equivalent to a narrowing of the interest rate differential, ∆ i, and for some
economies lying in Regions 3 and 5, it can move them to Region 1, depending on
whether their level of financial development, represented by their ordered pairs (φ ,
β ), lies in the vulnerability region defined in equation (8).
As in the previous case, an increase in the market valuation of a country’s
economic strength, E, increases the extent of the vulnerability region, A1. In
contrast, an increase in the domestic lending rate, iL, reduces the region A1 and
therefore, reduces vulnerability to a crisis, other things being equal.
VI. Economic Growth and Financial Crisis
To answer the question why high-growth countries are not immune to financial
crisis, we first examine the case of financial liberalization unaccompanied by
financial development. In our model, a fast growing economy is characterized by
a fast growing value of E. Recall the definition for the crisis-prone region, repro-
duced below for easy reference:
Clearly, the extent of region A1 depends on the market valuation of the funda-
mental strength of the economy, E. An increase in E enlarges the region A1 and
hence, increases the vulnerability to a financial crisis under financial liberaliza-
tion. Furthermore, typically, a fast growing economy will be characterized by a
high value of E and cheaper access to the world capital markets, which implies a
lower borrowing rate iB. The combination of these two factors can increase the
vulnerability of a country to a crisis if financial development does not take place.
When economic growth, financial development, and financial liberalization
proceed simultaneously, the interaction becomes very complex, and the right
sequencing of financial development and liberalization must be designed such that
financial crises are avoided. 
Figure 8 shows the effects of an increase in E. This increase shifts up the
surface S1, increasing the size of Regions 1, 3, and 5. Thus, economic growth can
put at risk economies that were previously in a safe region, such as those that were
originally situated in Region 2 but that now lie in Region 1 as a result of the
increase in E. For example, economies previously located in subregion A are now
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192opment is an even more urgent task in fast growing economies and should not be
put off for any reason: for any fixed combination of (φ , β ), fast growth would keep
increasing the market valuation E until the economy is swallowed by the ever-
enlarging crisis-prone region. Thus, if a country starts liberalizing its financial
sector during a period of rapid growth, it must undertake rigorous structural
reforms of its financial sector first or at least at a faster pace than the liberalization
process.
VII. Concluding Remarks
This paper has developed a model of financial intermediation that offers some inter-
esting insights into the interaction among economic growth, financial development,
financial liberalization, and the occurrence of financial crisis. By identifying basic
stylized inefficiencies of the financial sector, it is possible to derive simple graph-
ical tools that enhance our understanding about how naive combinations of finan-
cial development and liberalization can give rise to a financial crisis. In particular,
in the case of fast growing economies, financial development aimed at improving
the efficiencies of the financial sector becomes even more imperative. 
The analysis also highlights the fact that there are many different ways to
conduct an orderly sequencing of financial development and liberalization, such
that crises can be avoided. The preferred sequencing process would depend on the
objective functions of the policy makers, the set of economic and political
constraints they face, and the costs and benefits associated with each sequence of
measures. We consider that the determination of the optimal sequencing path
CRASH-FREE SEQUENCING STRATEGIES
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Figure 8. The Curse of Growth: Safe Subregion A in Crisis Region After an
Increase in Erequires the incorporation of these elements in the model and offers an interesting
research area.
Finally, it is widely believed that a decrease in the cost of borrowing abroad,
and an improving economic performance reflected in higher rates of growth and
in higher market valuation of a country’s assets by international investors, are
good for emerging economies. Moreover, rapid growth rates usually reduce the
borrowing costs faced by a country in the world markets, triggering bullish expec-
tations. The availability of cheap foreign capital and a growing economy can
effectively disguise the weakness of the financial sector, and get the financial
liberalization process started, amidst the generalized optimistic environment.
However, the combination of these two factors increases the country’s vulnera-
bility to a financial crisis. If financial development lags behind, the country is
flirting with disaster. The experience in Asia and Latin America as well as empir-
ical studies support this theoretical finding.13
APPENDIX
This appendix defines the equilibrium in the domestic credit market rigorously. Let’s denote the
set of monitoring actions A available to the intermediary by {M, N}, where M stands for moni-
toring the entrepreneur, and N stands for not monitoring the entrepreneur.
Given the parameters {φ , β , iB, iL, if, pH, pL}, a domestic equilibrium with intermedia-
tion is given by the choice of a monitoring action A {M, N} by the intermediary, and its
demand for deposits D (equal to the supply of loans to the entrepreneur) such that: (E1) D ≤
D –
A, where the maximum amount supplied by depositors, D –
A, is given by equations (1) and (2)
when A = M, N respectively, and (E2) A and D maximize the intermediary’s expected profits,
which is given by equations (3) and (4) when A = M, N respectively.
The following assumptions are sufficient to ensure that the upper bounds on deposits,
given by equations (1) and (2), are positive, to guarantee the existence of a domestic equilib-
rium with intermediation, and that the demand for deposits is always greater than the maximum
fully collateralized debt that the entrepreneur can afford, E/(1 + iL):
(A1) The intermediary’s borrowing rate is at least equal to the risk-free rate, e.g., ib ≥ if. 
(A2) pH(1 + iB) < 1 + if. 
(A3) pL(1 + iL) > 1 + iB. 
(A4)  After paying a fixed cost φ , the intermediary can monitor loan sizes less or equal to 
Dφ = = E/(1 + iL) + Eφ , Eφ constant.
In order to understand the concept of a crash in this economy, it is useful to interpret the
equilibrium as a mapping from the amount supplied by depositors into the monitoring decision
and demand for deposits of the intermediary. Thus, we can define a crash-prone or crisis-
prone equilibrium as a discontinuous mapping from the amount supplied by depositors into the
demand for deposits. Clearly, this definition implies that the demand for deposits is strictly less
than the maximum amount that depositors can supply given a monitoring action by the inter-
mediary, e.g. D < D –
A. This definition captures two important characteristics of a crisis. First,
there is a credit crunch in the sense that the total supply of loans in the domestic economy falls
short from the maximum available supply of deposits. Second, the existence of a discontinuous
mapping implies that small changes in a number of the parameters of the economy can lead to
a large change in the domestic supply of loans. 
Jorge A.Chan-Lau and Zhaohui Chen
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13See Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998).It can be verified that the {A, D} equilibrium can be one of the following six cases:
Case 1 (Crisis-Prone Equilibrium): If φ≤∆ p∆ iDφ and β≥ pH∆ i, there exists a crisis-prone
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In this case, there is no intermediation in the interval (Dφ ,  D*).
Case 2: If φ ≥ ∆ p∆ iDφ and β≥ pH∆ i, the equilibrium is {N, D
–
u(E)}.





m(E) ≤Du, where Du is the only solution to EΠ
m(D) = EΠ
u(D) in the interval
[E/(1 + iL), Dφ ].
b) {M, D
–
m(E)} if Du ≤D
–
m(E) ≤Dm and D
–
u(E) < Dm, where Du was defined above and Dm  is the
only solution to EΠ
m(D) = EΠ






Case 4: If φ ≥ ∆ p∆ iDφ and ∆ p∆ i ≤β≤ pH∆ i, the equilibrium is {N, D
–
u(E)}.





Du was defined above. Otherwise the equilibrium is given by {M, D
–
m(E)}.
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